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Abstract—This paper studies the secrecy transmission with
the aid of a large-scale multi-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF)
relay wireless powered by the source. Specifically, the wireless
energy harvesting (WEH)-enabled relay devices a hybrid receiver
architecture, in which the received power at each individual
antenna is split for energy harvesting (EH) and information
receiving (IR) in the first transmission phase; the aggregate of the
total harvested power is further split for cooperative jamming
(CJ) to confound the eavesdroppers, and AF using maximum
ratio combining (MRC) and maximum ratio transmitting (MRT),
respectively, at the relay in the second transmission phase.
Assuming that the eavesdroppers in the proximity are distributed
as Poisson point process (PPP), no channel state information
(CSI) but the density of which is known to the relay, the
ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) is used to characterize the secrecy
performance. The optimum portion of power allocated for CJ is
also derived to significantly improve on the ESR especially in the
case of high eavesdroppers’ density.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since privacy and security of data transmission has arisen
as a major concern in ubiquitous wireless communications
applications such as e-transactions, e-shoppings, and remote
information collection and/or retrieving etc., physical-layer
security (PLS) has been proposed as a promising solution to
achieve wireless information-theoretic security [1] by leverag-
ing intrinsic properties of wireless channels. Among various
signal processing techniques in PLS, cooperative jamming
(CJ), which generates synthetic noise via cooperative nodes
to obfuscate the eavesdroppers [2], has been substantially
investigated (see [3] and references therein) to break through
the “degraded eavesdropping channel” assumption.
One of the main obstacles that prohibit the CJ schemes
from being employed is that the potential helpers are usu-
ally themselves energy starving. However, recent advances in
wireless powered communication network (WPCN) (see [4]
and references therein) have provided them with essential in-
centives to assist in secrecy communications. [5] considered to
boost the secrecy information throughput via a wireless pow-
ered friendly jammer by judiciously designing power trans-
fer/information transfer cycles. In addition, a self-sustaining
harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol was proposed in [6],
where the robust CJ covariance matrices against imperfect
channel state information (CSI) were optimized subject to
harvested energy constraints of HJ helpers.
The advantage of radio frequency (RF) wireless power
transfer (WPT), notwithstanding its easy control, has been
compromised by its low power transfer efficiency due to
significant attenuation over distance as long as several meters.
Large-scale MIMO [7] has thus been motivated as resolution
for improving on WPT efficiency thanks to its enormous array
gain [8]. The benefit of massive MIMO brought into PLS
has also been studied in [9–12]. The secrecy performance of
matched-filter (MF) precoding along with artificial noise (AN)
generation was analyzed in [9] for multi-cell massive MIMO
downlink transmission taking pilot contamination into account.
The promising feature of WPCN has been very recently
embraced by massive MIMO for promoting wireless energy
harvesting (WEH)-enabled secrecy cooperation. WEH-enabled
amplify-and-forward (AF) relays have been early investigated
in [13]. Later their receiver (Rx) structure was further op-
timized for purely cooperative beamforming (CB), and joint
CB and CJ in [14] and [15], respectively. Secret transmission
assisted by a wireless powered massive MIMO relay through
WPT from the source was considered in [16], where explicit
expressions of secrecy outage capacity were derived under the
assumption of imperfect legitimate CSI and no eavesdropper’s
CSI to show that the challenging “long transfer distance” issue
has been well addressed.
The contribution of this paper are three-fold: the proposed
Rx architecture for the wireless powered multi-antenna AF
relay is, to the best knowledge of the authors, of the most
general form incorporating per-antenna based power splitting
(PS) and CJ synthesis; ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) is analyzed
for the proposed CJ-aided AF relay beamforming under the
practical assumption of no eavesdroppers’ CSI but only their
spatial density; optimum fraction of power allocation for CJ
is obtained.
Notations—We use the uppercase boldface letters to de-
note matrices and lowercase boldface letters for vectors.
The superscripts (·)T , (·)† and (·)H denote the transpose,
conjugate and conjugate transpose of either a vector or a
matrix, respectively. ‖ · ‖ stands for the Euclidean norm of
a vector, and the statistical expectation for a random variable
is denoted by E[·]. C(R)x×y denotes the space of complex
(real) matrices with dimensions specified by x × y. Also,
Γ(α) =
∫∞
0
exp{−t}tα−1dt is the gamma function [17,
chap. 8.31]; Γ(α, x) = ∫∞
x
exp{−t}tα−1dt is the upper
incomplete gamma function [17, chap. 8.35]. d(·, ·) represents
the Euclidean distance between two points. Finally, (x)+
denotes max(0, x).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider secrecy transmission with the aid
of a multi-antenna AF relay in a SWIPT system, where the
transmitter (Tx) sends confidential message to the legitimate
Rx far away from it exclusively via the multi-antenna AF
relay1 that is exposed to the illegal interception of a set of
eavesdroppers as far as up to Rmax away from it, denoted
by K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}, whose locations Φe = {ek|k ∈ K}
are modelled as homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP)
[19] (HPPP) with density λe. K is thus a Poisson random
variable (RV) with mean µ = λeπ(R2max−R20)), i.e., Pr(K =
n) = exp{−µ}µn/n!. The eavesdroppers are also assumed to
be distributed outside from a “security zone” centered at the
source with a radius of R0, since they are relatively easy to be
detected within the immediate reach of the Tx otherwise [20].
Except for the large-scale antenna equipped AF relay, all the
other nodes are equipped with single antenna each.
A two-hop half-duplex relaying protocol is considered to
consist of two equal-time transmission slot, the duration of
which is normalized to be one. The multi-antenna AF relay
assumed to be solely powered by its wireless harvested energy
from the Tx during the first transmission slot operates with
the per-antenna-based power splitting (PS) that allows each
antenna of the relay to harvest energy and to receive infor-
mation from the same stream of received signal. It is shown
in Fig. 1 that the ith antenna of the relay splits the received
power of αi for energy harvesting (EH) versus 1 − αi for
information receiving (IR), ∀i = {1, . . . , N}, upon receiving
yr. The harvested energy is then accumulated to be further
divided into two parts: one portion of ρ for generating a
friendly jamming signal, and the other 1 − ρ for amplifying
y′r.
The channel models consist of the large-scale path loss
and the small-scale fast fading, i.e., hsr = A
1
2
0 β
−α
2
sr h¯sr,
hrd = A
1
2
0 β
−α
2
rd h¯rd, and hre,k = A
1
2
0 β
−α
2
re,kh¯re,k, ∀k ∈ K,
which denotes the complex channels from the source Tx to
the relay, from the relay to the destined Rx, and from the relay
to the kth eavesdropper, respectively. A0 accounts for the free
space path loss; βjl = djld0 denotes the distance from j to l
with respect to (w.r.t.) a reference distance d0, for j ∈ {s, r}
and l ∈ {r, d, {e, k}}; α is the path loss exponential factor;
h¯jl’s represent the small-scale fading that is considered to be
independent Rayleigh fading, denoted by h¯jl ∼ CN (0, I).
The CSI from and to the relay regarding the main channel
is assumed to be known at the relay, while that regarding
the eavesdroppers are kept unknown except for their spatial
distribution density.
In the first transmission slot, the received signal at the front
of the wireless powered AF relay is given by
yr =
√
PsA0β
−α
sr h¯srs+ na, (1)
where s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
distributed RV, denoted by s ∼ CN (0, 1). Ps denotes the
1Direct links from the Tx to the Rx and/or eavesdroppers are assumed to
be broken due to severe path loss caused by constructions [18].
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Fig. 1. The PS protocol at the large-scale antenna equipped WEH-enabled
AF relay.
source transmit power, and na is the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) with zero mean and covariance matrix σ2naI .
In compliance with the antenna-wise PS receiver architecture
shown in Fig. 1, the total aggregate of the wireless transferred
power is identical to
N∑
i=1
η(1 − ρ)E[|√αiyr,i|2] = ηPsA0β−αsr ‖Dαh¯sr‖2, (2)
denoted by PEH, where 0 ≤ η < 1 is the EH conversion
efficiency, and Dα = diag([
√
αi]
N
i=1). Simultaneously, the
received signal that is fed into the input of the IR circuit of
the relay (c.f. Fig. 1) is given by
y′r = Dα¯(
√
PsA0β
−α
sr h¯srs+ na) + nc, (3)
where Dα¯ = diag([
√
1− αi]Ni=1), and nc ∼ CN (0, σ2ncI) is
the noise introduced by converting signal from RF band to
base band.
The relay then further splits its harvested power with a
fraction ρ: ρ for CJ vs (1−ρ) for AF. The normalized amplified
signal is expressed as x¯r = Fy′r, where F is the beamforming
matrix given by F =
¯hrd
‖
¯hrd‖
(D−1α¯
¯hsr)H√
‖
¯hsr‖2(PsA0β−αsr ‖
¯hsr‖2+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
‖D−1α¯
¯hsr‖2
. (4)
It is worthwhile noting that without (w/o) CSI of the eaves-
droppers at the relay, we propose to use F in (4) since it
achieves the optimal performance in conventional relaying
system w/o secrecy concern by jointly implementing linear
precoding, i.e., maximum ratio combining (MRC) and maxi-
mum ratio transmitting (MRT), at the Rx and the Tx of the
relay, respectively. The CJ signal is expressed as x¯j = Uv,
where U ∈ CN×(N−1) is made orthogonal to h¯rd such that
UUH = I − h¯rdh¯Hrd/‖hrd‖2, and v is composed of i.i.d.
CSCG RV with zero mean and variance 1/N − 1 . As such,
the signal to be forwarded is expressed as a whole by
xr =
√
(1 − ρ)PEHx¯r +
√
ρPEHx¯j . (5)
In the second transmission slot, the signal received by the
destination is thus expressed as
yd =
√
A0β
−α
rd h¯
H
rdxr + nd, (6)
where nd ∼ CN (0, σ2nd) is the AWGN at the destination Rx.
By substituting (5) into (6) with F replaced by (4), yd can be
recast as follows.
yd = c1
√
PsA0β
−α
sr ‖h¯sr‖2s+ c1h¯Hsrna
+ c1h¯
H
srD
−1
α¯ nc + nd, (7)
where
c1 =
√
η(1−ρ)PsA
2
0β
−α
sr β
−α
rd
‖Dα
¯hsr‖2‖
¯hrd‖2
‖
¯hsr‖2(PsA0β−αsr ‖
¯hsr‖2+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
‖D−1α¯
¯hsr‖2
. (8)
Similarly, it follows that
ye,k = c2,k
√
PsA0β
−α
sr ‖h¯sr‖2s+ c2,kh¯Hsrna
+ c2,kh¯
H
srD
−1
α¯ nc + c3,kh¯
H
re,kUv + ne,k, (9)
where ne,k’s are the AWGN at the kth eavesdropper, denoted
by ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2ne), c2,k =√
η(1−ρ)PsA
2
0β
−α
sr β
−α
re,k
‖Dα
¯hsr‖2
‖
¯hsr‖2(PsA0β−αsr ‖
¯hsr‖2+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
‖D−1α¯
¯hsr‖2
¯h
H
re,k
¯hr,d
‖
¯hr,d‖
, (10)
and
c3,k =
√
ηρ(1 − ρ)PsA20β−αsr β−αre,k‖Dαh¯sr‖2. (11)
In accordance with (7) and (9), the corresponding signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the destination and
the kth eavesdropper, ∀k ∈ K, can be expressed, respectively,
as (12) and (13) shown at the top of the next page.
III. LARGE-SCALE ANTENNA BASED SECRECY
PERFORMANCE
In this section, assuming that the number of antennas
equipped at the WEH-enabled AF relay tends to be very large,
the cumulative density functions (CDFs) of the destination
and/or the eavesdroppers’ SINRs are first characterized, based
on which the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) of the considered
system is evaluated. Then the optimum power allocation
between the wireless powered CJ and AF is derived to
achieve the maximum ESR. Prior to analyzing the ergodic
secrecy rate, the instantaneous SINR of the destination and
the eavesdroppers are first approximated by the following two
lemmas, respectively.
Lemma 3.1: The instantaneous SINR of the destination can
be approximated by
SINRr,d
a.s.−−−−→
N→∞
N1
D1
, (14)
where
N1 = η(1 − ρ)PsA20β−αsr β−αrd cN
N∑
i=1
αi, (15)
where cN = N2 +N , and
D1 = η(1− ρ)A0β−αrd
N∑
i=1
αi
(
σ2naN + σ
2
nc
N∑
i=1
1
1− αi
)
+ σ2ndc5, (16)
where c5 = cNN +
σ2nc
∑N
i=1
1
1−αi
PsA0β
−α
sr N
+
σ2na
PsA0β
−α
sr
, when the number
of relay antennas N tends to be very large.
Proof: In accordance with the law of large numbers [21,
Th. 8.1], for h¯sr ∼ CN (0, I), we have ‖h¯sr‖4 a.s.−−−−→
N→∞
cN ,
‖h¯sr‖2/N a.s.−−−−→
N→∞
1,
∥∥D−1α¯ h¯sr∥∥2 a.s.−−−−→
N→∞
∑N
i=1
1
1−αi
, and∥∥Dαh¯sr∥∥2 a.s.−−−−→
N→∞
∑N
i=1 αi, which can be plugged into (12),
and Lemma 3.1 thus follows.
Lemma 3.2: The instantaneous SINR of the kth eavesdrop-
per, k ∈ K, can be approximated by
SINRre,k
a.s.−−−−→
N→∞
N2
D2,k
, (17)
where
N2 = η(1 − ρ)PsA20β−αsr βre,k−αcN |Zk|2
N∑
i=1
αi, (18)
and
D2,k = η(1− ρ)A0βre,k−α|Zk|2
N∑
i=1
αi
(
σ2naN
+ σ2nc
N∑
i=1
1/(1− αi)
)
+ c5N +
(
σ2ne
+ ηρ(1− ρ)PsA20β−αsr β−αre,k
N∑
i=1
αi
)
, (19)
where Zk = h¯
H
re,k
¯hr,d
‖
¯hr,d‖
, ∀k ∈ K, when the number of relay
antennas N tends to be very large.
Proof: In addition to the known results from the proof
for Lemma 3.1, we have ‖UH h¯re,k‖2/N a.s.−−−−→
N→∞
1, since
UH h¯re,k ∼ CN (0, I) as a result of UHU = I .
Note that conditioned on HPPP, it is shown in (14) that the
instantaneous SINR of the destination remains deterministic,
while that of the kth eavesdropper turns out to be stochastic
due toZk’s that are i.i.d. RVs denoted by Zk ∼ CN (0, 1) [9,
Lemma 1]. Hence, only the CDFs of the eavesdroppers remain
relevant in terms of the ergodic secrecy rate. Besides, it is seen
shortly that the achievable secrecy rate of a wiretap channel
is only determined by the most detrimental eavesdropper, i.e.,
the one with the maximum eavesdropping channel capacity.
Hence, the CDF of the maximum eavesdropping SINR is
provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: The CDF of the maximum instantaneous
SINRre,k is derived as FΥ (υ) =

exp
{
− λeα exp
{−∆|c4|2υ} (∆υ)−2/α [πΓ ( 2α)
+
∫ 3π/2
π/2 Γ
(
2
α ,∆υ (−2R0 cos θ)α
)
dθ
]}
ifυ < υth,
1 otherwise.
(20)
SINRr,d =
|c1|2PsA0β−αsr ‖h¯sr‖4
σ2na |c1|2‖h¯sr‖2 + σ2nc |c1|2‖D−1α¯ h¯sr‖2 + σ2nd
(12)
SINRre,k =
|c2,k|2PsA0β−αsr ‖h¯sr‖4
σ2na |c2,k|2‖h¯sr‖2 + σ2nc |c2,k|2‖D−1α¯ h¯sr‖2 + σ2ne + σ2v |c3,k|2‖UH h¯re,k‖2
(13)
where
∆ = σ2ne
(
cN +
σ2nc
∑N
i=1
1
1−αi
+ σ2naN
PsA0β
−α
sr
)
/
(
η(1 − ρ)A0
N∑
i=1
αi
(
PsA0β
−α
sr cN − υ
(
σ2naN + σ
2
nc
N∑
i=1
1
1− αi
)))
, (21)
and υth = PsA0β−αsr cN/(σ2naN + σ
2
nc
∑N
i=1 1/(1− αi)).
Proof: First, the CDF of the maximum instantaneous
SINR among the eavesdroppers conditioned on HPPP is de-
fined as
FΥ (υ) = EΦe
[
Pr
{
max
ek∈Φe
{SINRre,k} ≤ υ
∣∣∣∣Φe
}]
= EΦe
[ ∏
ek∈Φe
Pr
{ |Zk|2 ≤ ∆υ (|βre,k|α + |c4,k|2)∣∣Φe}
]
= EΦe
[ ∏
ek∈Φe
[
1− exp{−∆υ (|βre,k|α + |c4,k|2)}]
]
, (22)
where c4 =
√
ηρ(1− ρ)PsA20β−αsr
∑N
i=1 αi/σ
2
ne .
Next, by using the Generating functional of HPPP , we solve
(22) as
FΥ (υ) = exp
{
−λe
∫
S
exp
{−∆υ (|βre,k|α + |c4|2)}dA}
(a)
= exp
{
− λe
∫ π/2
−π/2
∫ ∞
(−2R0 cos(θ))
+
exp
{−∆υ (rα + |c4|2)}
rdrdθ
}
= exp
{
− λe
α
exp
{−∆|c4|2υ} (∆υ)−2/α[
πΓ
(
2
α
)
+
∫ 3π/2
π/2
Γ
(
2
α
,∆υ (−2R0 cos θ)α
)
dθ
]}
, (23)
where S = {ek ∈ Φe|d(Tx, ek) ≥ R0} as accounted earlier in
Section II, which is equivalent to
√
r2 +R20 − 2rR0 cos(θ) ≥
R0 in polar coordinate originated at the relay, and thus leads
to (a).
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
The achievable instantaneous secrecy rate [2] conditioned
on Φe is given by r(inst)sec =
1
2
(
log2 (1 + SINRrd)− log2
(
1 + max
ek∈Φk
SINRre,k
))+
,
(24)
where 1/2 accounts for the two transmission slot. Plugging
into (24) (14) and (17), the approximate expression for r(inst)sec
when the number of relay antennas N tends to be very large
is thus obtained. Considering the no-delay-limited secrecy
information transmission to the destination, ESR is a relevant
metric that is given by [22] rsec =
1
2
(
log2
(
1 +
N1
D1
)
−EΦe
[
log2
(
1 + max
ek∈Φe
N2
D2,k
)])+
.
(25)
To calculate (25), we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3: Given a RV Υ with a continuous CDF FΥ(υ)
defined on [0,∞), it holds true that
EΥ [log2(1 + Υ)] =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + υ
(1− FΥ(υ))dυ. (26)
Substitute the CDF of the most detrimental SINRre,k de-
rived in (20) into (26), the ESR defined by (25) can be derived
as (27) at the top of the next page.
B. Optimal Power Allocations for CJ
The proper ρ portion of the harvested power needs to
be judiciously allocated, since the amount of CJ power is
supposed to be, on one hand, sufficient for combating as
many as an expectation of λeπ(R2max − R20) eavesdroppers,
and on the other hand, not too much to degrade the secrecy
information transmission. The ρ that achieves the optimal
trade-off between effective CJ and information AF is obtained
by solving the following problem.
Maximize
0≤ρ≤1
rsec(ρ) (c.f. (27)). (28)
It is easily seen from (27) that rsec(ρ) is continuous w.r.t. ρ
over [0, 1], and thus according to Weierstrass theorem, rsec(ρ)
can admit its maximum when ρ takes its optimum value, de-
noted by ρ∗. To obtain ρ∗, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2:
ρ∗ = argmax{rsec(0), rsec(χ)}, (29)
where χ is a set defined as χ = {ρ ∈ [0, 1] | f(ρ) = 0}, and
rsec(χ) denotes the finite list of rsec’s corresponding to each
element of χ. f(ρ) is given by (30), in which A, B, and C
have already been given in (27); E = −2α2 (∆υ)−2/α/(1 − ρ);
D and F are given by (31) and (32), respectively.
Proof: To derive ρ∗, we take ∂rsec(ρ)∂ρ , denoted by f(ρ),
and solve f(ρ) = 0, which yields a transcendental equation
that is hard to obtain its closed-form solutions. However, since
(30) is continuous w.r.t. ρ over [0, 1), this equation can be
solved by numerical means. As a special case, if χ = ∅, which
implies f(ρ) < 0 over [0, 1), ρ∗ is 0. This completes the proof.
rsec =
1
2
(
log2
(
1 +
N1
D1
)
− 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + υ
1− exp

−
λe
α
exp
{−∆|c4,k|2υ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
(∆υ)
−2/α︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

πΓ
(
2
α
)
+
∫ 3π/2
π/2
Γ
(
2
α
,∆υ (−2R0 cos θ)α
)
dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
C





dυ
)+
(27)
f(ρ) = − 1
ln 2
σ2ndc5N1/(1− ρ)
(D1 +N1)D1
− 1
ln 2
λe
α
∫ υth
0
1
1 + υ
exp
{
−λe
α
ABC
}(
1
α
ABD +
(
AE +
1
α
FB
)
C
)
dυ (30)
D = −1/(1 − ρ)
∫ 3π/2
π/2
exp {−∆υ(−2R0 cos(θ))α} (∆υ(−2R0 cos(θ))α)2/αdθ (31)
F = −∆υ exp{−∆|c4|2υ}
(
η(1− ρ)PsA20β−αsr
N∑
i=1
αi/σ
2
ne
)
(32)
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Fig. 2. The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate by the proposed AF relaying vs
the number of relay antennas, Ps = 30dBm, α = 2.5, and R0 = 13.33m.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to validate the
proposed CJ-aided wireless powered AF relaying against the
benchmark scheme, “w/o CJ”, in which ρ is fixed as zero.
The destination is assumed to be a total d = 20m far from
the source, while the AF relay is set on the source-destination
link with a distance of R0 from the source (d − R0 from
the destination). The eavesdroppers are deployed as HPPP
excluded from a “security zone” as stated in Section II. The
involved channels are modelled with all the relevant distances
referred to the relay as the origin. Unless otherwise specified,
d0 = 1m, η = 0.5, α = 2.5, Ps = 30dBm, σ2na = −110dBm,
and σ2nc = −70dBm. The average AWGN power at all the
nodes are set to be the same as σ2na + σ
2
nc .
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, analytical results are obtained from
the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate in (27) using the optimal
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Fig. 3. The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate by the proposed AF relaying vs
eavesdroppers’ density, Ps = 30dBm, α = 2.5, and N = 200.
power allocation factor ρ∗ in (29), while the simulation points
are plotted from the exact ergodic secrecy rate in (24). We
see that the simulation points are in precise agreement with
the analytical results of the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate at
large N (e.g., N = 160), which validates our analysis.
Fig. 2 shows the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate versus the
number of relay antennas N . As expected, the ergodic secrecy
rate increases with N , which results from the array again
brought by using MRT and MRC at the relay. For the given
density of eavesdroppers, the ergodic secrecy rate with CJ
using ρ∗ always outperforms that w/o CJ (see the simulation
points obtained by the exact ergodic secrecy rate) especially in
the situation of larger eavesdroppers’ density λe, which reveals
the considerable improvement on the ergodic secrecy rate with
the aid of CJ when the number of relay antennas is very large.
Fig. 3 depicts the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate versus the
density of eavesdroppers λe. We see that the ergodic secrecy
rate goes down with the increasing λe due to the increasing
chance of a very large SINRre,k. For the benchmark scheme
w/o CJ, the ergodic secrecy rate increases with the AF relay
located closer to the destination as a result of improvement
on the main channel’s capacity. Moreover, for the “with CJ”
scheme, the maximum shown ergodic secrecy rate is also
achieved with the shortest distance to the destination from
the relay (i.e., R0 = 2d/3), the behaviour of which is surpris-
ingly immune to the nevertheless longer WPT distance from
the source thanks to the large N . The obviously noticeable
performance gain by “with CJ” with λe up to 1, further
demonstrates the significance of CJ-aided cooperation design
in safeguarding the PLS.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the impact of MRC and MRT based
AF relay beamforming and CJ on the ESR for cooperative
secrecy transmission via a large-number-antenna equipped
WEH-enabled relay. Assuming full CSI of the legitimate
channel and no CSI of the eavesdropping channel, the ESR
was characterized by eavesdroppers’ spatial distribution den-
sity using stochastic geometry tools. The analytical results
were asymptotically achieved by simulations when the number
of relay antennas was vary large. In addition, the proposed
cooperation scheme with optimum power allocation for CJ was
shown to be prominently robust against an unknown number
of densely located eavesdroppers.
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